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Abstract: The ARTEMIS project is developing a semantic web service based P2P 
interoperability infrastructure for healthcare information systems that will allow 
healthcare providers to securely share patient records within virtual healthcare 
organisations.  Authorisation decisions to access patient records across organisation 
boundaries can be very dynamic and must occur within a strict legislative 
framework. In ARTEMIS we are developing a dynamic authorisation mechanism 
called PBAC that provides a means of contextual and process oriented access control 
to enforce healthcare business processes. PBAC demonstrates how healthcare 
providers can dynamically share patient records for care pathways across 
organisation boundaries. 
1.  Introduction 
The effective delivery of patient care requires that healthcare professionals have access to 
all relevant information regarding a patient’s condition when making decisions. Much of 
this information may be historic and may have been gathered over many encounters with 
healthcare providers in different locations using heterogeneous healthcare information 
systems. Typically, these systems are standalone, developed by many different suppliers 
and are incompatible with one another. The lack of integration between departmental, 
hospital and regional information systems in terms of well-defined business processes 
produces serious inefficiencies when delivering patient care [1]. 
  Government agencies, healthcare providers and systems vendors have various initiatives 
for integrating the healthcare enterprise; however, most strategies are based on centralising 
resources within an enterprise at the level of healthcare provider or healthcare region. For 
these reasons sharing patient electronic patient records across the borders of organisations is 
rarely achieved today. For example, the NHS IT programme in England is creating a NHS 
care record service that accesses clinical information held on a national database called the 
SPINE [2]. This service will only available in England and other UK regions have different 
strategies, which will make accessing patient data across all UK regions difficult. IHE have 
published the XDS: Cross-enterprise document sharing integration profile that provides a 
technical architecture for sharing patient records but security and privacy requirements are 
beyond the scope of their analysis [3]. 
  In the ARTEMIS project [4], [5] we are developing a semantic web service based P2P 
interoperability infrastructure for healthcare information systems that will support new 
ways of providing health and social care. Healthcare providers join an ARTEMIS network that supports virtual healthcare organisations where patient records are generated and 
maintained by autonomous healthcare providers and accessed using medical web services. 
In this paper, we describe the characteristics of virtual healthcare organisations and a 
supporting infrastructure for dynamically authorising access to stateful healthcare resources 
within the constraints of data privacy regulations. 
2.  Virtual Healthcare Organisations 
Virtual organisations can be defined as flexible, secure and coordinated resource sharing 
amongst dynamic collections of individuals, organisations and resources, in order to 
achieve a common purpose [6]. In healthcare, virtual organisations allow clinical staff and 
healthcare providers to collaborate with the objective of delivering patient care through the 
sharing of patient records and healthcare services. The lifecycle, structure and dynamics of 
a virtual organisation should be defined based on the business needs of its participants. 
However, existing infrastructure technologies tend to provide support for virtual 
organisations with constrained characteristics that are not well matched to the healthcare 
domain. Exploring how healthcare providers currently share services and patient records 
across organisational boundaries within the constraints of data privacy legislation provides 
us with important insights into the infrastructure capabilities required to support a virtual 
healthcare organisation.  
  Patient referrals are the key entry point to healthcare systems that allow intra- and inter-
enterprise collaboration in the delivery of patient care. Referrals allow care pathways to be 
created between primary care providers, specialists, labs and other healthcare organisations. 
For example, a referral may be as simple as a physician sending a patient to another 
physician for a consultation or it may be as complex as a primary care provider sending a 
patient to a specialist for specific medical procedures to be performed and attaching the 
payer authorisations for those requested procedures as well as the relevant clinical 
information on the patient's case [7]. 
  Each referral represents a specific pathway through a healthcare organisation and 
consists of a series of administrative and medical tasks. Healthcare professionals are 
authorised to carry out specific tasks assigned to them. Clerical officers may perform 
registration and booking whereas consultants may assess a patient’s condition and place 
appropriate orders. The authorisations to undertake referral tasks are dynamic and depend 
upon the overall referral state. For example, a consultant may be authorised to assess a 
specific patient only when an appointment has been scheduled. Within the context of a 
referral, healthcare professionals are responsible for controlling access to the data they 
generate. The consultant may then update the patient record following an assessment and 
delegate access to parts of the record to another doctor as necessary. 
  Healthcare providers operate within a strict regulatory framework that is enforced to 
ensure the protection of personal data and outlines conditions and rules in which processing 
is allowed. There are many such regulations at European level [8] and additional legislation 
implemented within member states [9]. According to EU Directive 95/46/EC, if a 
healthcare provider maintains personal data on its patients, the healthcare provider is 
identified as a data controller and is responsible for protecting that data against 
unauthorised use. If a healthcare provider wants to access personal data within another 
organisation they are identified as a data processor. For the communication to occur 
between data controller and data processor consent must be obtained from the patient and a 
contract between the two parties must exist that defines the scope of access to patient data 
including conditions such as what data is to be accessed, what use will be made of the data 
and how the data will be accessed. 
  
Figure 1. Healthcare business process for data access negotiation 
 
  Currently, healthcare providers implement an out-of-band business process that permits 
negotiation of data access agreements. Figure 1 shows an example business process based 
on an analysis of how South East Belfast Healthcare NHS Trust negotiate data access 
agreements within the constraints of the UK data protection act. To access patient records 
an external organisation has to request access by contacting a data guardian within the trust. 
The data guardian is an individual that is responsible for controlling access to patient data 
across the boundaries of an organisation. This may include requests from other healthcare 
providers or requests from patients to see their own records.  
  For access requests from other healthcare providers there are typically two 
circumstances, single requests to access data on a specific patient or longer-term requests 
for agreements to collaborate in the delivery of patient care. For requests to access specific 
patient records the data guardian should ensure that patient consent has been given before 
data is shared. The consent allows a patient to express privacy preferences regarding their 
data defining which organisations are authorised to access the data and for what purpose 
(e.g. the referral context). In exceptional circumstances, for example, if a patient is 
unconscious during an emergency episode, the data guardian can authorise access if they 
decide access is in the best interest of the patient. For longer-term collaborations a contract 
would be negotiated that is signed by a senior representative of each organisation such as 
the Chief Executive. 
  The existing business processes show that collaborations between healthcare providers 
are very dynamic and represented as bi-lateral data access agreements between data 
controller and data processor. Healthcare professionals need to share detailed information 
regarding the person’s condition when making decisions during tasks such as referral 
acceptance and patient assessment. In addition, patient consent should form part of 
authorisation decision, however, as with most healthcare situations there may be 
circumstances where human judgement needs to override. ARTEMIS is developing a dynamic authorisation mechanism called process-based access control to meet the 
requirements described above supporting healthcare business processes within virtual 
healthcare organisations. 
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Process Context is a reference ID presented to the service. The service uses this ID to 
retrieve the process identified by the Process Context, and can thus determine the position 
in the business process, and use this to make authorisation decisions. 
  Process-based authorisation is grounded in the service’s We
Unguarded, a Web Service interface is a collection of operations that may be executed by 
anyone at any time. PBAC dynamically permits and denies access to these operations based 
on: 
•  the user m
•  the state of the process referre
•  the operation requested by the user. 
  A Process Context ID refers to an i
has a static policy, describing its state model, the permissible state transitions, a set of 
operations, a set of Process Roles (different user types essentially), and finally a set of 
permissions that conjoin a state, an operation and a Process Role.  
  In addition to the Resource Type static policy, PBAC has a dy
like a repository of information regarding the access decision for a process acting on a 
particular Resource Type. This holds information such as the current state of a process, and 
which users have which Process Roles. Together the static and dynamic polices make up 
the entire authorisation decision. 
  The operations themselves ma
need for a meta-policy controlling who can update policy. Services operations may update 
the state of a process, change criteria defining which subjects can take which Process Roles, 
and create new Process Contexts.  
 
 
Figure 2. Healthcare resource model   Figure 2 shows the resource model used by the ARTEMIS infrastructure. The model 
contains the following elements: 
•  Patient, used to denote an individual patient 
•  Data Access Agreement, used to encapsulate a trust relationship between a referring 
healthcare organisation (data processor) and the healthcare organisation that maintains 
the data (data controller) 
•  Consent, used to encapsulate a trust relationship between a patient and a healthcare 
organisation 
•  Patient Referral, used to encapsulate an entire workflow for a specific care pathway 
provided by a healthcare organisation 
•  Patient Data identifiers, used to denote patient record data generated within a referral 
context 
  Process contexts can be hierarchical or based on complex rendezvous. For example, in 
Figure 2 a patient context is created when a healthcare provider registers the patient and 
referrals and consent (including the patient’s privacy preferences) are represented as sub-
contexts of the patient’s registration. However, when a healthcare provider wants to access 
a getPatientInformation service from another provider, PBAC requires a rendezvous of data 
access agreement and consent relating to the original referral context before authorisation 
can be made. 
 
 
Figure 3. Patient referral business process 
  For each resource defined in Figure 2 a process model has been developed. Figure 3 
shows the process model for a patient referral. The process describes possible referral states 
such as “Referral Requested” and “Appointment Scheduled” along with permissible service 
operations that can cause state transitions. When the patient referral service operation is invoked a new Process Context is created for the referral. Healthcare professionals that are 
assigned to the referral are allocated Process Roles that define permitted actions and 
associated state transitions. For example, when the Process Context is created a clerical 
officer may be allocated an Process Role that only allows them to book appointments 
whereby a consultant once an appointment is scheduled would be able to start assessment, 
request orders and refer the patient to other healthcare providers. 
4.  PBAC Architecture 
 
Figure 4. PBAC Architecture 
Figure 4 shows the high-level architecture of PBAC and how it can be deployed to provide 
dynamic authorisation for web services. The implementation is based on Apache Axis 
handlers that intercept incoming service request. We have a clear two-stage operation 
sequence for access control. Firstly, the client attributes are authenticated taking into 
account the roots of trust within the WS-Security handler [11]. We take “authentication” to 
mean that the message is checked for integrity (it has not been altered or tampered with and 
that it comes from a known client), the client is identified using attributes in their X.509 
certificate, and the service that PBAC protects trusts the issuer of the client’s certificate to 
correctly perform the identity checks and issue the certificate. This is a mature process 
using PKI-based technology and operational procedures, and does not merit discussion 
here.  
  The second stage of the process is authorisation. Once authenticated, the message is 
passed to the authorisation policy enforcement point. The enforcement point then checks 
the access policy by providing the attributes, operation and current context to the 
authorisation policy store. If the client is authorised to perform the operation within the 
current context the service is then invoked. Finally, if necessary the service can update the 
state of a process, delegate Process Roles to other users, and create new Process Contexts. 
5.  Pilot Application Scenario 
An ARTEMIS pilot application is being deployed by healthcare providers located in two 
European countries to demonstrate the interoperability of healthcare information systems 
across organisational and country boundaries.  The pilot application includes healthcare providers South East Belfast Healthcare Trust (SEBT) in Belfast, Northern Ireland and 
Hacettepe Hospital in Ankara, Turkey. Each healthcare provider operates within distinct 
legislative domains and has different healthcare information systems to support patient care 
[12], [13]. 
  The clinical scenario focuses a Belfast businessman who is admitted to Hacettepe 
hospital on a business trip to Ankara in Turkey. The businessman has an ongoing heart 
condition and is receiving treatment in Belfast from the SEBT District Nursing team 
following an episode in a Belfast Acute hospital. The assessing doctor knows the patient is 
from Northern Ireland and searches the ARTEMIS network for healthcare providers within 
Northern Ireland that hold records for the patient using a patient record discovery protocol 
[14]. Once patient records have been located at SEBT, the doctors at Hacettepe hospital 
negotiate a data access agreement (DAA) with the SEBT data guardian using the electronic 
healthcare record management service. The doctor can then directly request specific 
documents such as the assessment, case notes and medication record defined in the DAA by 
quoting the DAA Process Context ID when invoking the Retrieve Information for Display 
service.  
  Both healthcare providers and healthcare information system vendors are evaluating 
PBAC as part of the ARTEMIS pilot application in accordance with ISO 14598 [15]. These 
stakeholders offer different evaluation perspectives that will enable PBAC to be validated 
against a wide range of criteria to ensure its suitability for authorisation within a service-
based virtual healthcare environment. SEBT is evaluating PBAC from a usability 
perspective, for example, validating how complex authorisation decisions can be supported 
in accordance with existing security policies and measuring the reduction in cost and time 
in creating data access agreements through dynamic authorization compared with existing 
out-of-band procedures. TEPE is evaluating PBAC from a technical perspective to validate 
that the architectural approach (static policies, Process Roles) can be easily integrated with 
existing healthcare information systems without affecting key characteristics such as 
performance, reliability and maintainability. 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented a dynamic authorisation mechanism called PBAC that is 
being developed within the ARTEMIS project to support business processes in virtual 
healthcare organisations. PBAC provides a means of contextual and process oriented access 
control to enforce a business processes associated with a stateful resource model accessed 
through web service operations. PBAC demonstrates how healthcare providers can 
dynamically share patient records for care pathways across organisation boundaries.  
  PBAC offers significant benefits to healthcare providers including: 
•  Ability to provide complex authorization decisions at a service level based on resource 
state, contracts and patient consent in accordance with business processes. 
•  An improved availability of patient data during assessments by providing access to a 
virtual healthcare record, removing the need for retrospective analysis 
•  Reduction in cost and time in creating data access agreements through dynamic 
authorization compared with existing out-of-band procedures 
  The initial evaluation is focusing on specific healthcare professionals using a limited 
collection of web services accessing patient data to support the pilot application scenario. 
However, in practice healthcare systems are typically complex with rich data sets accessed 
by hundreds of users. In these circumstances, the service provider may need to develop 
static policy and associated Process Roles for many resource types depending upon the 
business needs. Future work will extend the pilot application to incorporate a wider range 
of resource types allowing the scalability and maintainability of PBAC to be validated. 
Tooling to ensure rapid development of service policies will be developed. In addition, future work will seek to standardise PBAC interfaces and policy language by implementing 
and contributing to standards such as WS-Policy [16] and WS-Trust [17].  
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